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TT abstract In recent decades, the West has appeared 
almost ‘invincible’ when faced with the threat of exogenous 
environmental or biological shocks. In accordance with 
traditional modernity narratives, infectious diseases 
particularly seemed to belong to either the premodern 
world or a contemporary ‘underdeveloped’ world. Now 
that the West is in the full grip of a pandemic, however, 
it has become increasingly difficult to uphold the same 
modern/non-modern dichotomy. Moreover, the arrival of 
COVID-19 in Western countries has been characterised 
as a consequence of institutional failure or at least an 
omen of future structural institutional change. These 
institutions, however, are known to have been designed 
for perpetuating the ‘status quo’ rather than protecting 
the societies they govern against environmental shocks. 
Accordingly, we argue that modern institutions should 
not be seen as smooth, hermetically sealed, protective 
systems, but rather as inherently uneven, imperfect 
structures whose imperfections come to the surface in 
times of crisis. That is to say that institutional systems may 
ultimately prove capable of withstanding environmental 
shocks, yet social groups and ecological systems may 
still remain vulnerable, raising questions with regard 
to theoretical frameworks and methodologies used by 
historians on this topic.
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Introduction
Many Western governments were slow to implement institutional responses 
and legislative measures to the threat of COVID-19, as is now widely recognised 
by public health officials across various countries. Although ‘outbreak narra-
tives’ – the fear of disease spread in one direction only from ‘marginalised’, 
‘deviant’ or ‘underdeveloped’ groups to ‘native’, ‘mainstream’, or ‘developed’ 
society (Wald, 2008) – have been prevalent in Western media and popular 
culture for a long time, the chances of an outbreak actually occurring across 
large parts of Western Europe were not seen as realistic. Indeed, from its early 
emergence, COVID-19 was Orientalised as a ‘Chinese phenomenon’ – a moral 
judgement on a society based around concepts of degeneration, decay and 
insalubriousness (with special scrutiny for the wet-market concept: Lynteris, 
2016), and thus an ‘underdevelopment’ narrative. Yet perhaps paradoxically, 
this was simultaneously accompanied by moralizing concerns connected to 
‘over-development’, with Western anxieties over rapid social and economic 
changes occurring in a Chinese context where this transformation is not 
straightforwardly transparent to the outsider (Lynteris, 2018: 52). Accordingly, 
this established a narrative of development and modernisation left unchecked 
and encroaching upon the ‘natural’ environment – a liminal state where 
‘old’ and ‘new’ collide – and thus creating conditions conducive for a newly 
emerging virus to take root. Meanwhile, such a virus working its way around 
Western European populations was apparently unthinkable in the context 
of the trust put in ‘modern’ and efficient institutions, emerging from its 
‘democratic’ and ‘open’ societies. Put simply, epidemics seemed to belong 
either to the ‘premodern’ or the ‘developing’ world – or in the case of China 
a world seen to be out of kilter with its environment – and accordingly, the 
fact that COVID-19 took root and rapidly proliferated in Europe was difficult 
to accept for many of its inhabitants and governments.
The discrepancy of a perceivably ‘modern’ society dealing with a ‘premodern’ 
issue in the form of a pandemic has encouraged historians to provide their 
take on this global process; even arguing for a more prominent place in the 
discussion on government policies of prevention and recovery (de Graaf et al., 
2020). As argued recently, however, it might be much more useful for historians 
to take the pandemic as an opportunity for investigating the workings of 
institutions during crises, rather than predicting contemporary institutional 
behaviour by consulting the past (Curtis and van Besouw, 2020). We argue 
that ‘the institutions’ of present-day Western societies are, in fact, supposed 
to efficiently guide everyday-life rather than protect us from uncommon 
crises. In addition, these institutions are so multifaceted that generic claims 
of ‘institutional failure’ or ‘institutional change’ lack analytical value.
Based on these insights, we suggest that the COVID-19 pandemic poses 
several challenges to how we as historians have come to think about institutions 
and the way we analyse them. Instead of understanding institutions as rigid 
systems smoothing everyday life for its subjects – thus either failing to do so, 
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or standing on the verge of fundamental change in case of an environmental or 
biological shock – this paper suggests that institutions were never tight, rigid, 
waterproof safeguards of society, but rather uneven, imperfect organisations 
whose flaws became more clearly exposed with the arrival of the COVID-19 
pandemic on its soil.
Institutions and Systemic Resilience
It might be tempting to characterize the arrival of COVID-19 in the ‘developed’ 
world as a prominent example of institutional failure or the harbinger of 
institutional change. However, such views reflect a certain misunderstand-
ing of institutional functioning and their very ontology, as they depict the 
institutions governing societies as a protective force, either from above or 
from below. Instead, following the consensus definition, institutions are the 
often embedded formal and informal behavioural rules and organisations 
governing interactions among people (North, 1990: 3; Allen, 2012: 25). Indeed, 
institutions can be understood as a system organizing the way people live 
together, and as such, they reflect an ideological reality in addition to a physical 
one. Institutional bodies, then, such as the state or the market economy, are 
the closest thing to the physical manifestation of institutions, expressed in 
organisations and practices that govern processes of societal coexistence. 
At the same time, even such encompassing and visible institutions operate 
in tandem with a plethora of other institutions, both formal and informal, 
tangible and vague, comprehensive and marginal. In this paper, we mostly 
focus on the interplay between formal institutions and social practices, as 
formal institutions can steer certain directions and outcomes which in turn 
can be negotiated or outrightly rejected by such practices. To be sure, as we 
elaborate upon in the next paragraphs, this kind of understanding of institutions 
implies distinguishing between the systematic functioning of institutions on 
the one hand, and society on the other.
Regarding institutions as complex systematic sets of rules and societal 
organisation offers problems in relation to frameworks of resilience and 
vulnerability. Tim Soens argued on the basis of premodern floods in the 
North Sea area that concepts of systemic survival, failure or collapse often 
obscure more accurate representations and understanding of coping practices, 
hardship and vulnerability of individual agents. Indeed, in the resilience and 
vulnerability framework, it has long been accepted that the only way a system 
can be vulnerable is for it to collapse (Soens, 2018). It is, however, much 
likelier for systems to survive repeat hazards and even unexpected shocks 
(through absorption, adaptation, or transformation) than to collapse under 
their influence. Furthermore, the stronger a system is ingrained – reflected 
by widespread acceptance of the status quo and a certain self-evidence in the 
reproduction of this system – the easier its job is to sustain itself. All cogs work 
to keep the system in place and, as even historians such as Walter Scheidel 
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and Guido Alfani – both known for putting epidemics on the map as drivers 
of societal change – have stressed in recent publications (Scheidel, 2020; 
Hartog, 2020; Alfani, 2020a), it takes a very specific set of circumstances for 
such a system to collapse. In that sense, perhaps ironically, it is unlikely for 
the ‘Corona Crisis’ to become the much-prophesized ‘great leveller’.
If frameworks of vulnerability and resilience, then, prove inadequate 
for illustrating institutional performance, it could be said that national and 
international institutions were not just ‘unprepared’ to face a pandemic – they 
were simply never designed to do so. This is reflected in awkward short-term 
reactions to the pandemic. Until the Dutch government settled on full reliance 
on its public health institution, it was mostly uncertain in which measures to 
take, creating a backlog in implementing any such measures. When Germany 
was faced with its first COVID-19 victims, its forensic institutions had no 
procedures for dissecting disease-related bodies and dissection was in fact 
initially discouraged by the national public health institute, whose advice was 
subsequently rejected by forensic investigators (Püschel and Aepfelbacher, 
2020). As in premodern times, many countries have faced issues with the 
logistics of removing corpses, as the existing procedures are unfit for deal-
ing with surging death rates (Shankar, 2020). The Economist has recently 
pleaded for the installation of global institutions monitoring and preventing 
infectious diseases (The Economist, 2020). It is almost as though epidemics 
had completely vanished from collective institutional and cultural memory 
through conceived lack of necessity, and only now the West seems to align 
the non-modern scenario of a pandemic with modern institutional behaviour.
Resilience, Vulnerability, and Epidemics  
in Historical Research
One of the issues regarding the assumed invincibility of North-Western 
European societies is the rigidity of systematic modernity thinking. Economic 
history – most notably global economic history – has been overflowing 
with assumptions on Western modernity and Europe’s long-lasting leading 
position in the world. Joel Mokyr famously attributed the rise of Europe 
to the Scientific Revolution, accrediting Europe’s ‘counting, categorisation 
and cataloguing’ – in other words, the ‘European tradition’ of attempting to 
understand the natural world systematically – as the beacons of European 
prosperity (2005: 289). The COVID-19 pandemic makes it all too clear 
that Mokyr’s three C’s may provide structure and intelligibility to our lived 
experiences – it can even be said that it helped streamline many processes, 
polishing man-made systems inspiring efficiency and growth. But the natural 
world, of which we are very much still part, is still one of messiness, and 
our governmental, economic, social, and scientific institutions are still, in 
spite of their successes, no more than frameworks through which the world 
functions. Although such Western modernity narratives have been challenged 
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for decades, a deep-rooted narrative of Europe’s Enlightenment paving a road 
that logically results into prosperity, freedom, and safety has been, one could 
say, resilient in the face of most critiques.
On the specific topic of epidemics, historians have tended to fall into the 
same grand narrative trap, favouring statements that prove epidemics to set in 
motion one thing or another, pushing society down a certain path, with which 
historians undermine the ‘lumpiness’ of (historical) reality, and therefore 
effectively undoing one of their greatest strengths. Diseases – sometimes 
working in conjunction with other environmental or climatic pressures – have 
been held responsible for the decline of empires (Harper, 2017), transition of 
economies of entire world regions (Campbell, 2016; Voigtländer and Voth, 2013), 
or the reversal of economic fortunes between regions (Alfani, 2013; Pamuk, 
2007). Perhaps this is unsurprising, given the central place of the Black Death 
in the historiography of epidemics which has tended to emphasize this plague 
as a ‘watershed moment’ that precipitated radical and lasting changes within 
economy, society, politics, health and culture (Cohn, 2002; 2006; Campbell, 
2016: criticised recently in Geltner, 2020: 4–5). Yet it must be noted that the 
evidence on these egalitarian effects are on one hand often ambiguous (see, 
for instance, the critique of real wages as a straightforward index for living 
standards: Hatcher, 2018) and on the other hand misrepresented through 
focus on certain forms of measurement, presenting the idea of epidemics as 
instigating or accelerating societal transitions.
Thus, for example, overemphasis on the aggregate survival of institutional 
and societal systems framed as ‘resilience’ – or, through lack thereof, as failure 
or collapse – has obscured hardships and suffering ‘on the ground’ dictated 
by a hidden layer of vulnerability (van Bavel et al., 2020). Similar sentiments 
could be expressed with regard to recent historical studies on post-hazard or 
post-epidemic redistribution of resources, where Gini coefficients have been 
produced showing how, for example, plague mortality affects the distribution 
of property or wealth towards either increased or decreased inequality, but 
only at the aggregated level of the region or locality (many of those empirical 
studies summarised in Scheidel, 2017; and more recently in Nigro, 2020). It 
is clear that such measures, although valuable for discerning general trends 
in preindustrial inequality and between-region comparison, obscure other 
forms of entrenched inequality leading to societal vulnerabilities that exist 
beneath the basic numbers, particularly when it comes to disruptive events 
like epidemic outbreaks.
The question then rises: what are we actually measuring when performing 
these calculations? How much of societal vulnerability are we capturing? What 
does a Gini coefficient in wealth distribution say about female capacity to secure 
welfare or protection in the aftermath of a hazard or crisis (Ogilvie, 2020)? 
Indeed, how many studies into post-hazard economic inequality in recent years 
have incorporated sex-disaggregated information? Furthermore, how are the 
elderly or minors or disabled members of a community catered for? What do 
fluctuations of Gini coefficients imply in terms of social mobility and the life 
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chances of the young? Fragmentation of property into the hands of grateful 
heirs might mean little if those same people face broader social inequalities 
driven by prejudice and persecution – elements which sometimes are ignited 
down different lines of gender, socio-economic status, insider-outsider status, 
and race and ethnicity during epidemic outbreaks (Cohn, 2018). Does the 
perception of the poor – and conceptions of fairness and equity – mirror 
potentially fluctuating trends in the distribution of economic resources? Such 
questions remain hidden beneath aggregate numbers and conceptual focus 
on disease as watershed moments, while they may provide more insightful 
answers in terms of the social and economic effects of epidemics.
Other issues remain important when looking at the redistributive effects 
of epidemics and their consequences for societal vulnerability. Epidemics 
may lead to fragmentation or consolidation of estates through inheritance or 
the land market, but not all premodern communities drew their welfare from 
private property markets – instead the access of individuals and households to 
collective and common resources seemed of higher importance (although they 
sometimes mirrored private property inequalities: Curtis, 2016a). Sometimes 
it was not the distribution of wealth per se that changed after hazards and 
crises, but the precise composition of wealth – with some wealth such as land, 
produce or money more visible than other forms of wealth obscured from 
view such as investments in financial packages – with obvious implications 
for measurements of redistributive effect (Zuijderduijn and De Moor, 2013). 
It should also be noted that in some cases, large amounts of resources – wealth 
and property – within a region went unrecorded, or rather untaxed, due to 
aristocratic or ecclesiastical privileges.
Another question raised with regard to redistribution in the aftermath 
of epidemics relates to the poor propertyless – how do those that are often 
left off of the fiscal registers (that comprises much of the underlying source 
material from which the Gini coefficients are composed) fare? Particularly 
given the importance of the propertyless in the ‘great leveller’ thesis – the 
combination of rising real wages and land abundance is argued to provide 
propertyless survivors to acquire newly available land with newly raised 
wages (Scheidel, 2017: 297–298) – it seems to be a worthwhile exercise to 
examine fluctuations of the propertyless over time. It has been argued that 
truly propertyless households often make up such a small percentage of the 
total that, if taken into the calculation, they should steer the results towards 
slightly higher inequality and thus confirming the long-term trend, or hardly 
affect the trend at all (Alfani, 2020b: 22, based on cases in Italy and Germany 
for which propertyless numbers were available, or where they were able to 
be calculated). But even if the propertyless are small in numbers, the more 
important question is whether the share of propertyless is stable over time, 
especially in the face of social upheaval. Moreover, the point is to look beyond 
larger trends and investigate how economic effects of epidemic mortality 
shape people’s lives in socioeconomic terms. That is to say an increased focus 
on the top wealth decile has definite uses for distilling distribution numbers, 
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but a sharper look at specific property attainment – particularly for those 
previously excluded from property markets – may show the more interesting 
changes ‘on the ground’.
Tenure also remains a complex issue to integrate. Post-hazard inequalities 
at the ‘owner level’ have been shown to exist simultaneously with egalitarian 
tendencies and greater access to secure property at the user level via various 
forms of long-term hereditary lease (Curtis, 2016b). How do we assess 
tendencies such as increased equality in the distribution of wealth after the 
Black Death in certain localities within the Florentine contado, when at the 
same time, other scholars have pointed to the entrenchment and proliferation 
of sharecropping farms worked under very inegalitarian and onerous terms 
and conditions (van Besouw, 2019; Curtis, 2020)? It should also be noted 
that not all conditions of inequality created conditions of immense hard-
ship: large landowners such as manorial lords, aristocrats and ecclesiastical 
institutions sometimes had paternalistic duties of care and welfare to weaker 
members of society (Van Onacker, 2019), even if this was sometimes born 
out of self-interest – for example, not wanting to find new tenants, or putting 
down the seeds of social unrest. Put simply, how do we incorporate all these 
developments and nuances into our measurements of the discernible effects 
of epidemics on welfare? Indeed, what is the value of precise observations of 
post-epidemic redistribution – for example, in the form of Gini coefficients – 
when the aim is to understand and track the underlying ‘real’ inequalities? 
More importantly, how can we augment current measures to incorporate 
changes in structural inequalities?
To summarise, measurements of post-epidemic redistribution have tended 
to overly stress singular economic effects of mortality, essentially pointing 
towards overall structures – such as inequality as measured through Gini 
coefficients – that say rather little about actual mechanisms of post-epidemic 
redistribution. Much of the historical evidence itself remains ambiguous and 
inconclusive. For example, a perceived rise in real wages in the late Middle 
Ages after the Black Death has been debated by questioning the assumed 
number of average working days per year for certain social groups and 
occupations (Hatcher, 2018). Elsewhere, Gini coefficients said to measure 
wealth inequality do not necessarily explain the precise composition of that 
inequality – indeed, property may well change hands between family members 
who already had similar levels of access to that same property. Furthermore, 
the explanation of the evidence tends to stress aspects that overlook general 
tendencies of continuity. For example, there has been significant focus on the 
dip in wealth inequality in the direct aftermath of the 1629–1630 Ivrea plague 
outbreak, while hardly referring to the fact that inequality levels recovered 
very rapidly or that the extent of the dip was not particularly large in the 
first place (Alfani, 2010a; 2010b). This kind of presentation of the evidence 
has helped steering the discipline of historical research into epidemics 
towards the idea that significant spiked excess mortality has the ability to 
fundamentally transform societal structures through demographic fluctuations 
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influencing simple economic mechanisms of supply and demand. Put simply, 
epidemics obviously have social and economic effects, but we should also 
reflect upon the likelihood that these tend to only affect societies briefly and 
contingently, and as a result, challenge us to ask deeper questions beyond 
the aggregate numbers, as laid out above.
Conclusion
Overall, we make a case for shifting away from a rigid view of institutions 
safeguarding systems by whose grace modern life can be safely and prosperously 
led – something completely exposed by the processes connected to COVID-19 
in the West. – Rather than predicting structural change or characterising modern 
institutions as failing to stand up to the task, it may be more apt to refer to 
the imperfections of these systems as ‘holes’ in resilient phenomena, leaving 
particular groups vulnerable. Through the COVID-19 pandemic the next few 
years may bring similar rethinking on the criteria seen to be most relevant 
and foregrounded when addressing epidemics (and other hazards) further 
back in the past in historical research. Are our measurements of resilience 
and inequality at all meaningful, and more to the point, to what extent and 
precisely how do institutions play a role here? Indeed, it has been suggested 
that institutions during and in the aftermath of hazards were controlled and 
dictated by an uneven array of social interest groups, resulting in outcomes for 
their own benefit or to reinforce a ‘status quo’ (van Bavel, 2016). Accordingly, 
‘control’ of these institutions is seen as the essence of social vulnerability, 
predicated on the back of unequal distribution of resources. Although logical, 
another point of view could suggest that the real essence of coping capacity 
lies with those agents and actors with little or no power or control over the 
precise mechanisms guiding institutions – and little capacity to access the 
resources, protection and welfare supplied within these institutions – but 
instead were still able to circumvent, negotiate or avoid the formalised layer 
of institutional options thus resorting to various forms of rule breaking, 
foot-dragging and passive resistance. Those individuals and groups who had 
greater scope for circumvention, were those that coped most effectively. The 
difficulty for the historian, of course, is that much of this remains obscured 
from view and out of the eye of the documentary record, and the challenge 
remains to find ways to bring these hardships and burdens to the surface.
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